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Abstract
In the last two centuries, Muslim modernists have introduced major
legal reforms that led to the restriction of the range and scope of Islamic
Shari’a Law and the overhaul of legal thought and practice in the Muslim
World. Nevertheless, every time a new legal reform is proposed, it is met
with outcries from Islamists who label it un-Islamic and blasphemy against
God. This paper examines some major premodern scholars of Islamic
jurisprudence whose thought and practice about Shari’a Law featured
tremendous flexibility in the way they understood their role as legislators and
accepted a diversity of rules. The paper shows how important Islamic history
is for a proper understanding of Islamic Shari’a Law, which accommodates
change and constant interpretation.
Keywords: Islamic Shari’a Law, Muslims and Modernity, Islamic Legal
Reforms

Resumo
Nos últimos dois séculos, os modernistas muçulmanos introduziram
reformas legais importantes que levaram à restrição do alcance e do escopo
do Direito islâmico da Shari’a e à revisão do pensamento e da prática
legais no mundo muçulmano. No entanto, toda vez que uma nova reforma
legal é proposta, ela é recebida com protestos de islamistas que a rotulam
como anti-islâmica e blasfêmia contra Deus. Este artigo examina alguns
importantes estudiosos pré-modernos da jurisprudência islâmica, cujo
pensamento e cuja prática sobre o Direito da Shari’a apresentavam uma
tremenda flexibilidade na maneira como eles entendiam seu papel como
legisladores e aceitavam uma diversidade de regras. O artigo mostra como a
história islâmica é importante para uma compreensão adequada da Shari’a,
que acomoda a mudança e a interpretação constante.
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2. The historical record

In a speech on the National Women’s Day on 13
August 2018, the Tunisian President Mohamed Beji
Caid Essebsi endorsed the Colibe report (issued by the
Commission of Individual Liberties and Equality on 1
June 20181) and announced that he will submit a request
to Parliament to amend the law of inheritance, giving
women and men equal rights. Essebsi’s announcement
was met with angry reactions from many Tunisian
Islamists who alleged that it contradicts the terms
of Islamic Shari’a law, which assigns to men a higher
share of inheritance than to women. Al-Azhar, the
most influential religious institution in Sunni Islam and
based in Egypt, joined the fray. It issued a declaration
that labeled the proposal un-Islamic because it violates
the clear stipulation of God’s revelation, specifically
verse 11 of chapter 4 in the Qur’an: “God commands
you that a son should have the equivalent share of two
daughters.”

The historical record demonstrates that the
overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists throughout
the centuries did not take the word of the Qur’an
literally as something absolute, and sometimes ruled
on matters without first examining the Qur’an.2 When
they took notice of what the Qur’an stipulates, they
either freely amended the text by playing it against
other revealed sources (other qur’anic verses, Sunna of
Muhammad, Bible, etc.) or ignored it and heeded the
views of the founding fathers (mainly, the Companions
of Muhammad and their successors). They even devised
hermeneutical tools in order to make the Qur’an say
something different from the literal meaning.

The objection of Tunisian Islamists, al-Azhar,
and other Islamist groups is grounded in a highly
contentious belief that Muslims (and humans in general)
have no authority or agency to amend what God has
clearly and definitively stipulated in the Qur’an. It might
sound astonishing to many today that this view is not
in agreement with the position of most premodern
Muslim jurists who had a fundamental role in defining
and laying out the theoretical and practical apparatus
of Islamic Shari’a law. It is also not in agreement with
the general tendency of these same groups who have
supported major overhaul and modification of Shari’a
law in recent decades. This paper will examine some
discussions by leading legal jurists from premodern
times in order to show the flexibility with which they
dealt with issues pertaining to Shari’a and what role
they gave to the legal injunctions of the Qur’an. It
highlights the importance of history in understanding
the dynamics of Islamic Shari’a law, and exposes the
manipulation of religion done today by some Islamist
groups, whose rejection of certain initiatives to amend
Shari’a law is politically motivated.

1 The reports was issued in three languages: Arabic (https://
colibe.org/ريرقتلا/?lang=ar), French (https://colibe.org/lerapport/), and English (https://colibe.org/report/?lang=en).

An example that displays this tendency on the part of
premodern Muslim jurists is the following from a very
influential legal text by Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037),
who was a significant Sunni legal theorist and belonged
to the Sunni sub-school known as the Shafi’i school.3
In his discussion of the permissibility of seafood, alBaghdadi noted not only the broad disagreement among
schools but also the one within his own:
The followers of al-Shafi’i disagree concerning
aquatic animals. Some claim that fish are permissible
but that frogs are forbidden. Others say that if the
animal is in the form of a fish or of an animal
ritually slaughtered in good faith then the eating
of it is permitted if it comes from the sea without
being ritually slaughtered; however, if it is of a form
of something which is not permitted to be eaten in
good faith, then one is forbidden to eat it. This is
the judgement of Abu Thawr.
Others say that everything from the sea is to be
judged by the law of fish except the frog which is
forbidden because the Prophet forbade killing it.
This is the judgement of ‘Ali ibn Khayran.
Malik and Rabi’a declare all aquatic animals
allowable, even the tortoise and the like. This is
suggested by a report from Abu Bakr who said:
“There is nothing in the sea besides animals which
2 For a new pioneering study on early Islamic legal thought, see
Lena Salaymeh, The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate
Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
3 Sunni Islam is branched into several schools, of which only
five exist today: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Zahiri. Each of
these schools has its own Shari’a system, and they disagree on some
fundamental aspects of legal theory and practice. As a result of
modern legal reforms and the creation of nation states, most Sunnis
today are not aware of this diversity, and the realm of each school,
except in two countries (Saudi Arabia and Iran), has been reduced to
a very small area: family law, marriage, inheritance, religious rituals,
and the like.
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Abu Hanifa forbids everything which does not have
the form of a fish among the aquatic animals.4

Even though the discussion is about practice (what
seafood is legitimate to eat and what is not), it actually
exposes the complexity of legal theory in the first
centuries of Islam, which left its mark on the nature of
Islamic Shari’a law since. It is rather astonishing that the
Qur’an – which actually provides a statement on this
issue: “Licit for you is the game of the sea and its food”
(Q. 5.96) – is not cited or even mentioned. Al-Baghdadi
gave four differing views as reflective of what was
accepted among Sunni jurists. One view references the
prophet Muhammad, who only forbad eating the frog
(probably on account of it being amphibious, meaning it
belongs to two realms). Another view cites the opinion
of the first caliph Abu Bakr, who allowed everything
in the sea.5 A third view is attributed to a leading jurist
from the ninth century named Abu Thawr (d. 854) who
only legitimized the eating of seafood that looks like
fish or is similar in shape to land animals that are edible.
A fourth view is ascribed to Abu Hanifa (d. 767) – the
eponym of the most popular school of Sunnism (the
Hanafi school) – who declared that for seafood to be
edible it must be in the form of a fish (which is very
likely based on Jewish law, specifically Leviticus 11:9).
The discussion effectively means that medieval Sunni
jurists placed on the same par the practice (Sunna) of
the prophet Muhammad, the view of caliph Abu Bakr,
and the views of jurists Abu Hanifa and Abu Thawr.
Al-Baghdadi did not say that Muslims must look into
the Qur’an and follow verbatim what it says, which
would have disallowed the views expressed by prophet
Muhammad, Abu Hanifa, and Abu Thawr.
It is also interesting to point that al-Baghdadi’s
discussion underlines the two aspects of law: the
dynamic and the static. The opinions of Muhammad,
Abu Bakr, Abu Hanifa, and Abu Thawr were expressed
as part of the dynamic process of law making. Over
time, they became static laws.
A second example comes from another powerful
4 Al-Baghdadi, Usul al-din, translated in Andrew Rippin and Jan
Knappert, Textual Sources for the Study of Islam (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1990), 106.
5 It is unclear if Abu Bakr based his view on Qur’an 5:96. It
seems rather obvious that al-Baghdadi did not make a connection
between the two and assumed that Abu Bakr’s view reflected his
personal opinion.

legal manual by the jurist Ibn Qudama (d. 1223), who
was a renowned theorist of the Hanbali school of
Sunni law. In his discussion of the maximum duration
of a pregnancy, Ibn Qudama admitted that there is no
agreement among Sunnis on this question, and he listed
the different views about it, which range from two years
to no limit.
• 2 years: ‘A’isha6 (d. 678), Abu Hanifa7 (d. 767),
Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778), and Ibn Hanbal8 (d.
855).
• 3 years: Al-Layth b. Sa’d (d. 791)
• 4 years: the overwhelming view of the Hanbalis,
al-Shafi’i9 (d. 820), the popular view of Malik10
(d. 795).
• 5 years: ‘Abbad b. al-’Awwam (d. 804).
• 6 years: al-Zuhri (d. 741).
• 7 years: another view attributed to al-Zuhri.
• No limit: Abu ‘Ubayd (d. 838).11
As the above list shows, medieval Muslim jurists
did not have a uniform position about the maximum
duration of a pregnancy. We find this disagreement not
only between leading jurists, but also within the same
schools. We also find missing in this discussion the
view of the Qur’an, which actually addresses the issue
of pregnancy in the verse that says: “its bearing and
weaning are thirty months” (Q. 46.15). Thus, according
to the Qur’an, it takes thirty month to conceive of and
nurse an infant. Although the text does not specify the
exact length of each stage, it is rather evident that if the
two stages cannot exceed two and a half years,12 then the
pregnancy itself must be less than that. (Interestingly,
the view of al-Azhar has been consistent with the list
above rather than with the explicit text of the Qur’an).13
How come we find premodern Muslim jurists and
schools of Shari’a disagreed with the Qur’an? The direct
6 Wife of Muhammad, she was a major transmitter of hadiths
and her statements feature in many discussions about Islamic law.
7 Major early jurist who is the eponym of the Hanafi school.
8 Major early jurist who is the eponym of the Hanbali school.
9 Major early jurist who is the eponym of the Shafi’i school.
10 Major early jurist who is the eponym of the Maliki school.
11 Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1968),
8:121–122.
12 If the Qur’an actually means 30 lunar months, then the entire
period would be equivalent to 2 years and 5 months in the common
calendar.
13
See for example the position expressed by the vice
president of the Azhar University: <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6IV4JRdes0A> (accessed on 3 February 2019).
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The dynamism and diversity of classical Islamic legal
theory and practice was informed by a fundamental
presupposition that essentially delegated to the jurist
the task to “poking” in God’s mind and determine
what God intended. This is best expressed in the
following words of one of the most authoritative Sunni
theologian/jurist, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111).
They convey the general attitude of many jurists when
it came to determining Shari’a law. Al-Ghazali listed
four pivots that represent a road map for the jurist, and
inform the principles of Islamic law and how to deduce
laws from the sources:
1. The first pivot is the fruit, which refers to
the rules themselves: mandatory, prohibitive,
suggestive, restrictive, permissive, reprehensible,
etc.
2. The second pivot is the fruit-bearer, which
refers to the three sources: the Book, the Sunna,
and Consensus and nothing else.
3. The third pivot is the method of harvesting,
which refers to the methods of inquiry:
according to the explicit meaning, implicit
meaning, pervasive use, or rational and
deductive analysis.
4. The fourth pivot is the harvester, who is the
seeker.15
It is clear that for al-Ghazali, deducing laws from the
fundamental sources is not a passive process. Rather it
hinges on the seeking jurist following a sophisticated
method of inquiry. The jurist must carefully examine
14 See, for example, Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal
Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 1.
15 Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, ed. Muhammad al-Shafi (Beirut: Dar
al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyya, 1993), 7.

the language (laid out in no. 3) in order to produce from
the sources (the Qur’an, the Sunna of Muhammad
and the Consensus of early jurists) the different types
of rules (enumerated in no. 1) and thus define Shari’a
law. As such, the sources do not speak for themselves.
They need the jurist to say what they mean according
to a set of hermeneutical tools, which, for all intents
and purposes, become as important as the sources
themselves.
Al-Ghazali’s view is one of many variant views on the
sources and tools that form the bases of the principles
of Islamic Shari’a law. And it is true that Muslim jurists
never agreed on these sources/tools and their ranking.
However, their disagreement is often over who is
entrusted to be a seeker, and whether this is something
divinely ordained to a specific lineage or attained by any
Muslim through study and expertise. For instance, Shi’i
jurists take the Imam (often nicknamed the Speaking
Qur’an)16 as God’s delegate to be the absolute source
on legal and religious matters; it is no surprise that
adherence to the Imam and his teachings is the main
tenet of Shi’ism. Jurist al-Qadi al-Nu’man (d. 974) best
expressed this premise:
God revealed His Book, gathered together in it all
the religious obligations that he imposed on the
worshipers, clarified in it that which He saw fit to
clarify, and left ambiguous in it that which He saw fit
to leave ambiguous. He did this in order to compel
the worshipers thereby to need those whom He
made superior to them and obedience to whom He
imposed as an obligation of the faith, and in order
to guide them to the Imams. He taught the Imams
exclusively knowledge of the religion, and caused
the believers to need the Imams in that regard.17

Thus, according to al-Qadi al-Nu’man, the Imams,
and only them, can speak on behalf of God and clarify
to their followers God’s laws which he communicated in
the Qur’an, the clear therein and the hidden. It follows,
therefore, that the believers should not seek on their
own the Qur’an directly because doing so will lead them
to error.
Besides, Shari’a has other principles that govern the
thinking process of the jurists. They fit under the broad
16 On the Imam as the speaking Qur’an, see Muhammad Ali
Amir-Moezzi, The Silent Qur’an & the Speaking Qur’an: Scriptural
Sources of Islam between History and Fervor, trans. Eric Ormsby (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
17 Al-Qadi al-Nu’man, Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of
Islamic Legal Theory, ed. and trans. Devin J. Stewart (New York: New
York University Press, 2015), 45.
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answer is that the Qur’an was not the starting point or
the absolute authoritative text when it came to Islamic
legal theory and practice. We thus realize how flawed it
is to classify the Qur’an as the starting point of Islamic
law (and Islamic thought in general) as some modern
scholars have argued.14 Moreover, in this discussion of
the maximum length of a pregnancy, we also see the
dynamic aspect of Islamic law in its formative phase
(the conversations and differing views of early jurists),
which became later on the static legal framework by
which many jurists abided.
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This is best summed up in the following words of
the famous Tunisian jurist Ibn ‘Ashur (d. 1973), which
bring to mind the view of al-Ghazzali discussed above:
In instituting the commands, the Lawgiver has
primary and secondary objectives. Some of these
are explicitly stated, some merely alluded to,
while others are to be inferred from the texts. We
therefore conclude from this that whatever is not
clearly stated but can be arrived at from induction,
is intended by the Lawgiver.20

The words of Ibn ‘Ashur, like those examined
previously, point to the realization among most Muslim
jurists about the complexity of defining Shari’a law,
and the important role of the jurists in determining, on
behalf of God, God’s intent. Therefore, the jurist must
always subject the textual sources to a rigorous process
of examination and inquiry in order to make sure that
what is intended by the Lawgiver is made known.

3. Modernity and Islamic Law
The advent of modernity in the nineteenth century
caused a major change in the attitudes of Muslims
towards Shari’a law and its realm and legal apparatus. I
precisely mean here the adoption of a new legal system
in every Muslim country based on a modern constitution
that in some cases superseded Shari’a, limited Shari’a
to a specific realm, or functioned in parallel to Shari’a.
Muslim reformers realized that political reform (which
they saw as the fundamental step towards the political
empowerment of the Muslim World against European
18 On the notion of “Objectives of Shari’a, see the studies in
Adis Duderija (ed.), Maqasid al-Shari’a and Contemporary Reformist
Muslim Thought: An Examination (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
19 On the premodern debate regarding whether there is such
a purpose, see Rami Koujah, “Divine Purposiveness and its
Implications in Legal Theory: The Interplay of Kalam and Usul alFiqh,” Islamic Law and Society 24 (2016): 171–210.
20 Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn ‘Ashur, Maqasid al-shari’a al-islamiyya
(Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 2011), 20.

hegemony) could not be achieved unless the Shari’a is
heavily reformed and reduced to a small realm (primarily
marriage contracts, inheritance, religious rituals, and the
like).
Modernists have argued that the true teachings
of Islam and the voice of the Qur’an show that God
delegated the legislative matters to the Muslims to
decide them. For instance, in his Proposed Political, Legal,
and Social Reforms, the Indian modernist Cherágh Ali
(d. 1895) declared that “the only law of Mohammad
or Islam is the Korán.”21 Then he contended that, “the
Korán does not profess to teach a social and political
law” and that “it was neither the object of the Korán,
the Mohammadan Revealed Law, to give particular and
detailed instructions in the Civil Law, nor to lay down
general principles of jurisprudence.”22 He concluded
by saying that the Islamic tradition “unfetters us”
from traditional Shari’a, and “encourages us to base all
legislation on the living needs of the present, and not
on the fossilized ideas of the past.”23
Similarly, the great religious reformist Muhammad
‘Abduh (d. 1908) of Egypt divided Islam into two
components: 1) beliefs and religious practices, and 2)
social relations. He posited that beliefs and religious
practices are regulated by God and Muhammad, and the
Muslims (be they individually or communally) cannot
change these rules. Social relations, however, are to be
determined by the Muslims themselves because civil law
has to conform to the ever-changing conditions of the
Muslims.24 ‘Abduh also introduced the very powerful
concept of talfiq (hybridization) in order to allow the
jurist to bypass the limitations of his own school and
reach outside of it to another school if its Shari’a is more
appropriate for particular purposes.25 The success of
‘Abduh’s hybridization system is so widespread among
Sunnis that the majority do not uphold anymore to the
strict school system (most Sunnis today might not even
know to which school of Sunni law they belong, or are
21 Cherágh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in
Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammadan States (Bombay: Education
Society’s Press, 1883), ii.
22 Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms, xiv.
23 Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms, xl.
24 Muhammad ‘Abduh, “iIkhtilaf al-qawanin bi-ikhtilaf ahwal
al-umam,” in al-A’mal al-Kamila, ed. Muhammad ‘Imara (Beirut: alMu’assasa al-’Arabiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1972).
25 On the notion of “hybridization,” see Mohammad Hashim
Kamali, “Shari’ah and Civil Law: Towards a Methodology of
Harmonization,” Islamic Law and Society 14.3 (2007): 391–420.
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concept of what some modern jurists call Maqasid alShari’a (Objectives of Shari’a).18 Three are significant:
istihsan (subjective reasoning), maslaha (public welfare),
and darura (dire necessity). The Objectives of Shari’a
take their logic from the belief that Shari’a has a
purpose, and this purpose is to benefit those who
believe in God.19 So, the rules of Shari’a are simply the
means to achieve this aim and what God truly intended.
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Modern Muslim jurists have generally accepted the
logic that changing conditions necessitate changing
Shari’a laws. I will discuss two examples that illustrate
this tendency. They relate to two components of the
pilgrimage (Hajj) rituals: one is the quota placed on the
number of Muslims who could make the Hajj each year,
and the other is the restriction on animal sacrifice that
each pilgrim is mandated to offer at the conclusion of
the pilgrimage. Both of these measures amend prior
laws set by all classical schools of Shari’a.
According to the Qur’an (verse 3: 97), “Pilgrimage
to the House (Ka’ba) is a duty owed to God by people
who are able to undertake it.” Jurists have understood
it to mean that those who do not have the financial
means or good health are exempted from this religious
requirement. But as a result of the massive increase in
the number of pilgrims coming to Mecca in the 1970s
and 1980s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia requested
that Muslim jurists support a rule to limit the number
of Muslims who could make the pilgrimage each year
because the venues cannot accommodate everyone who
wants to come. The decision was to set a yearly quota
per country: one in every thousand Muslims can make
the pilgrimage in any given year, and this was ratified by
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in its
meeting held in Jordan in March 1988.
A similar petition by the King of Saudi Arabia was
submitted to the Supreme Council of Senior Religious
Scholars in Saudi Arabia to impose a limit on the number
of Muslims inside the Kingdom. It was discussed and
approved by the Council on 1 August 1997. The fatwa
that the Council issued gives the following rationale for
placing a limit on the number of pilgrims:
The Council discussed the reality of the matter
with respect to the Hajj and what the pilgrims
experience in terms of excessive congestion at
many of the ritual sites, roads, and places, which
is caused by the surge in the numbers of pilgrims
in the last few years. This is happening despite the
efforts that the government of Saudi Arabia – may
God make it successful – has undertaken in order
to ease the access to ritual sites and the continuous
measures it is adopting every year to facilitate to the
Muslims the performance of the Hajj. … As such,
the Council of Senior Religious Scholars does not
see any reason to prevent a policy that organizes
the Saudi pilgrims, including that, as long as dire
necessity requires it, the government not permit
who performs the Hajj to repeat it unless five years
have lapsed, as is the case with non-citizens who

reside in the Kingdom.26

It is clear from the text quoted above that what
necessitates amending Shari’a law and imposing a
restriction on the number of pilgrims is the issue
of congestion that is harmful to pilgrims. Thus, the
principle of dire necessity allows the jurist to amend
Shari’a law.
The second case also relates imposing restrictions
for reasons that have to do with problems caused by
the changing circumstances. Classical schools of Shari’a
unanimously stipulated that at the conclusion of the
Hajj rituals, each pilgrim must offer an animal sacrifice
and administer it in person, or at least be present during
the slaughter. Due to the massive number of pilgrims
converging on Mecca, the practice has become a
sanitary and organizational nightmare. Jurists could not
ban the practice outright because it was well entrenched
in religious law. Instead, they issued a restriction in the
form of an encouragement to pilgrims to delegate this
ritual to an organization that would do the sacrifice
on behalf of the pilgrim, provided it meets certain
requirements. Instead of offering a sacrifice, pilgrims
are now “encouraged” to purchase a certificate stating
they have fulfilled the obligatory ritual of sacrifice.
Below is a legal fatwa issued in 2010 by the former mufti
of Jordan Nuh Ali Salman, which allows the pilgrims to
delegate a company to do the sacrifice on their behalf:
It is permissible to delegate the purchase and
slaughter of sacrificial animals to others. Thus, it is
not prohibited according to Shari’a for the Muslim
to delegate this to a trustworthy company. He
pays to it the cost of the sacrificial animal, and the
company purchases and slaughters the animal, even
if it takes place in a country outside the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, because elsewhere the animals are
cheaper. But there are a few conditions that must
be observed:

• The slaughter must occur on the day of the
Adha Holiday or the three days that follow it.
• The sacrificial animal should not be younger
than five years for camels, two years for cattle
or goats, six months for sheep provided they
are fattened.
• The sacrificed animals must contain no
blemishes or disabilities that compromise their
shape; for example, it is not permissible to
sacrifice an animal that has lost an eye.
26 The fatwa is posted on <http://almoslim.net/node/217782>
(accessed 3 February 2019).
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not aware that there is not one single Shari’a in Islam).
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effort to protect their turf and monopoly over Islamic
Shari’a.
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• Some of the meat must be distributed to poor
Muslims.
• If the company is delegated to slaughter
for many people, the butchers must have a
list of the names of delegators, and should
mention each one ahead of the slaughter of
the corresponding animal, and say that it is
sacrificed on behalf of so-and-so. I am told that
the companies that offer such a service do so.
• In conclusion, we thank those companies that
do this service because they facilitate for the
Muslims the fulfillment of this ritual, at a cost
most Muslims can afford. May God reward
them well.27
In this fatwa as well, it is evident that the notions of
public welfare and dire necessity, and given the noble
objectives of Shari’a, give the modern jurists power to
amend any stipulation pertaining to Islamic law. This
shows the willingness of modern jurists to amend the
law, and the extent to which Islamic law operates today
according to modern concerns and priorities.
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